Giving Compass' Take:

• Hideki Matsunaga highlights overarching learnings from the successes and failures in reconstruction efforts in Iraq since 2003. 

• How can these learnings be applied elsewhere? What additional support is needed in Iraq? 

• Learn about the needs of refugees in Iraq. 

What lessons—positive and negative—can we draw from the Iraq reconstruction experience? The recently published report, “The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 – Learning from its Successes and Failures” identifies several key lessons:

First, actions taken by the international community need to reinforce national success through national institutions. The drive for early results does not justify bypassing national institutions; donors should work through them. A U.S. audit report states that donor-funded physical infrastructure put in place since 2003 was already breaking down by 2005 since Iraqi institutions were not fully engaged, and the roles of institutions in operating and maintaining infrastructure were not sufficiently considered.

Second, international actors need to adopt a flexible approach to deal with the uncertain, fluid, and complex nature of reconstruction, even when facing increased security risks. Effective implementation depends in large part on the ability to adapt to constantly changing conditions, a difficult task that most donors and international organizations struggled with in Iraq. It is true that maintaining a presence within a country under volatile security conditions increases the risks for concerned staff, but it also provides better opportunities to interact with counterparts and enhance the effectiveness of assistance. Retaining a presence in less volatile parts of Iraq might have allowed for more flexible responses.

Third, problems related to accountability have a major impact on reconstruction outcomes. For example, dual accountability, the tendency for donors and international organizations to be accountable first to their domestic constituencies and only second to those of recipient states—can make delivering results on the ground difficult. In Iraq, superiors back in donor capitals often overlooked or dismissed the good intentions of international staff in the field.

Read the full article about lessons from the Iraq Reconstruction by Hideki Matsunaga at Brookings.