A wave of “foreign agent” laws has further chilled civic space around the world in recent years. As civil society actors devise strategies to push back against these repressive tactics, private philanthropy and bilateral and multilateral donors have vital support roles to play. They can help civil society prepare for future challenges, so that it is organised not only to respond to evolving forms of repression but also to get ahead of them by tackling their root causes.

Responding to “Foreign Agent” and Wider Security Laws

In a growing number of countries, autocratic and illiberal democratic governments alike are adopting Russia’s model of restricting the free exercise of civic power by targeting foreign funding and international assistance. From Georgia and Nicaragua to India and Israel, governments intent on curbing or controlling civil society and peaceful dissent have introduced “foreign agent” and other restrictive measures to achieve their goals. In response, funders have increased or provided new resources through established mechanisms to enable civil society’s mobilisation against such legislation. Yet this support is sometimes criticised for not being early or swift enough to forestall restrictive measures or for not being sufficiently long-term to build the collective power needed to prevent such measures and safeguard civic space. Even when efforts to push back against a proposed “foreign agent” or other restrictive law were successful, such as in the case of Georgia in 2023, the government was able to pass it later by repackaging it or once international attention waned.

Chilling as they are, “foreign agent” laws are just one aspect of a broader effort to repress the operation of free civic space. States are increasingly turning to what the Civic Futures initiative calls the security playbook. It includes “foreign agent” and other laws that impede and criminalise activism, technologies that surveil and censor activists, and fear-based narratives that portray civil society (and its donors) as undermining national sovereignty and security.

This growth in the abuse of state security power is a systemic and structural issue. It is enabled by an expanding global security (especially counter-terrorism) architecture codified in resolutions and standards set by the United Nations (UN) and other bodies like the Financial Action Task Force; by defence, security, and technology industries that are ever more intertwined with the state and its functions; and by a public discourse on security and rights and freedoms that is shaped by state, corporate, and social media actors who foster toxic narratives of othering, fear, scarcity, and competition.

A reactive and ad hoc response will not stem the attack on civic space. Funders of civil society must develop strategies and provide relevant resources that address it, with long-term approaches to disrupt and transform the security paradigm harming civil society.

Read the full article about defending civic space by James Savage at European Democracy Hub.